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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN MICHAEL HASSELBLAD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20020730-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a second degree felony. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 
2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Where defendant did not propose his lesser-included offense 
instruction until two court-imposed deadlines had passed and the trial 
court had already compiled its instructions, did the court abuse its 
discretion in rejecting the instruction as untimely? 
A trial court's decision to refuse a jury instruction as untimely is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
II. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's lesser-included offense 
instruction where defendant's own testimony, if believed, would acquit 
him on possession of stolen property? 
"
6[T]he refusal to give a requested jury instruction on a claimed lesser included 
offense is a legal determination, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness.'" State v. 
Payne, 964 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
III. Was defendant entitled to his lesser-included offense instruction on 
possession of stolen property where the instruction contained two 
elements not required by statute and thus did not accurately state the 
applicable law? 
Because the trial court did not reach this issue, no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules, relevant to this appeal, are reproduced in 
Addenda A and B respectively: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(2001); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999). At trial, defendant requested an instruction on possession 
of stolen property as a lesser-included offense (R. 249:91-92). After the trial court denied 
defendant's request, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 167; R. 249:94-95). The 
trial court suspended defendant's statutory prison term and ordered defendant to serve 
365 days in jail and 36 months on probation (R. 185). The trial court subsequently denied 
defendant's motion for new trial (R. 228). Defendant timely appealed (R. 229). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At about 3:30 p.m. on August 14, 2000, Candida Rodriguez was in her yard when 
she saw a group of teenagers walking slowly up and down the street, looking around (R. 
249:10, 11, 13, 14). Ms. Rodriguez noticed one girl in the group in particular, who was 
wearing a red blouse and black skirt (R. 249:12). 
A few minutes later, Ms. Rodriguez left her home in her car (R. 249:13). When 
she returned about fifteen minutes later, Ms. Rodriguez was met by neighbors who told 
her that someone had broken into her house and that they had already called police (R. 
249:15). Ms. Rodriguez noticed that her front door was open and that her VCR and boom 
box were missing from the front room (R. 249:16). Ms. Rodriguez had purchased the 
VCR about a month before for about $200 (R. 249:17). She had purchased the boom box 
about a year before also for about $200 (R. 249:17-18). 
When Deputy Sheriff Todd Sisneros arrived shortly thereafter, Ms. Rodriguez 
gave him a description of the girl with the red blouse and black skirt (R. 249:20, 57). 
Several hours later, a girl matching that description was located by police (R. 249:58-59). 
Ms. Rodriguez identified the girl, Sheree Simpson, as the one she had seen earlier that 
day (R. 249:20, 59). 
After being picked up by police, Sheree admitted that she and defendant, as well as 
some other teens, were hanging out in the vicinity of Ms. Rodriguez's home earlier that 
day (R. 249:32-33). At one point, Sheree noticed that Ms. Rodriguez's door was open (R. 
249:33). When Sheree went to close the door, one of the girls she was with entered the 
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house and told defendant there was boom box inside (R. 249:34). Defendant entered the 
house and took the boom box (R. 249:34-35, 60). He then re-entered the house and took 
the VCR (R. 249:34, 37, 60). Defendant took the boom box and the VCR to his sister's 
house a few blocks away (R. 249:37, 40). 
Based on Sheree's explanation, Deputy Sisneros went to the home of defendant's 
father, where defendant lived, at about 9:00 p.m. (R. 249:60-61). In defendant's room, 
under a blanket between the bed and a wall, Deputy Sheriff Sisneros found Ms. 
Rodriguez's VCR and boom box (R. 249:62-63). Defendant was not home at the time (R 
249-61). 
About an hour later, defendant's father called Deputy Sisneros to tell him that 
defendant was home (R. 249:63-64). When Deputy Sisneros met with defendant shortly 
thereafter, defendant told Deputy Sisneros that people had brought the items to him for 
repairs (R. 249:64). Defendant said he didn't know who the people were and could not 
give the officer any names (R. 249:64). 
At trial, Sheree identified the girl who first entered Ms. Rodriguez's home as 
April, defendant's former girlfriend (R. 249:33, 48). April's brother, David, was also 
present at the scene (R. 249:33). 
Defendant's defense. Defendant's father testified that, on August 14, defendant 
was in and out of the house most of the day (R. 249:72). However, around 3:30 p.m. or 
4:00 p.m., "it seems like that's when he was home" (R. 249:72). Mr. Hasselblad also 
testified that, while napping around 3:00 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., he was awakened by his dog 
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barking (R. 249:72-74). At that time, he noticed defendant carrying some electronics 
equipment (R. 249:73). Defendant told his father that three kids had come over and 
handed him the stuff (R. 249:73/74). Defendant then left to go out with them (R. 
249:74). When Mr. Hasselblad looked out the window, he recognized defendant's former 
girlfriend, April (R. 249:74). He also saw a male and another female, but did not 
recognize them (R. 249:75). 
Defendant testified that he saw Sheree Simpson, his former girlfriend April, and 
April's brother David on August 14 when they stopped by his house in the afternoon and 
dropped off a VCR and boom box (R. 249:77-78). April knew defendant worked on 
electronic equipment and asked him to look at the VCR because a line in the back had 
been ripped out (R. 249:78). Defendant did not ask the teens any questions (R. 249:83). 
When his father asked him whose equipment it was, defendant told him it was none of his 
business and took the equipment into his bedroom (R. 249:79). Defendant then left to go 
to a friend's house (R. 249:82). 
Defendant testified that he heard later that the police had come by the house and 
taken the VCR and boom box (R. 249:79). At the time, he didn't know why "but I got 
word going through Magna on foot coming home that the cops were out looking for me 
so I hurried home as soon as possible" (R. 249:79). By the time the officer arrived 
shortly thereafter, defendant knew that the VCR and boom box were stolen property (R. 
249:79). 
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On cross-examination, defendant admitted that, although he has a hobby of fixing 
electronics (R. 249:83-84), he has not taken classes for it (R. 249:84-85). He did "[n]ot 
really" know what a capacitor was, and, when asked to explain what a diode was, he said: 
"Kind of hard to explain. I'm not really too much into it but I know the chips and 
everything are on circuit boards and mostly what they do, like sound chips" (R. 249:84). 
Defendant did not have an oscilloscope (R. 249:84). The only equipment he had was "a 
soldering gun and solder and wire" (R. 249:84). 
Defendant's proposed jury instruction. At the end of a pre-trial hearing on May 
21, 2001, the trial court set defendant's trial for July 11, 2001 (R. 248:16). The court then 
scheduled a final pre-trial conference for July 9, 2001, and ordered that "jury instructions 
will be due" at that time (R. 248:16). Defendant neither objected to the court's order nor 
requested an exception for lesser-included offense instructions (R. 248). 
When defendant's trial was continued until September, the trial court again 
instructed the parties to submit their proposed instructions at the final pre-trial conference 
(R. 252:Tab 1:2). Again, defendant neither objected to the trial court's order nor 
requested an exception for lesser-included offense instructions (R. 252:Tab 1). 
When the court continued defendant's trial to October and reset the final pretrial 
conference for September 24, 2001, the court indicated, "I've already got your jury 
instructions" (R. 252:Tab 2:2). Defendant did nothing to indicate he reserved the right to 
propose further instructions during trial (R. 252:Tab 2:2). 
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Defendant's trial was held on October 4, 2001 (R. 249). Just before lunch, the 
prosecutor stated that he believed all the evidence in the case, from both the State and 
defendant, would be presented by 3:30 p.m., and thus that the case could go to the jury 
later that afternoon (R. 249:42). The following then occurred: 
Court: In order to do that, we'd have to spend some time on 
jury instructions at some point and since you're 
apparently not available over the noon hour today, is 
that correct, [defense counsel]? 
Defense counsel: Right, Your Honor. I have to teach a class. I 
could take a look at the jury instructions. It's a simple 
case so I don't imagine I have — 
Court: I don't think we should need a lot of discussion. What 
I'll do is go ahead and put them together the way I 
propose to give them over the noon hour and those will 
be sitting on your desk when you get back and if you 
could find a moment to take a quick look at them and 
maybe just on the break we could have a discussion 
about that. 
(R. 249:42-43). At the end of the lunch break, without raising any jury instruction issue, 
defense counsel immediately began cross-examining the State's witness then on the stand 
(R. 249:44). 
At the close of the evidence, the trial court excused the jury and turned to the jury 
instructions (R. 249:91). After defense counsel noted he had no objections to the 
instructions compiled by the court, the court turned to the State (R. 249:91). The State 
indicated it had no problem with the instructions provided by the court (R. 249:91). 
However, the State continued, "I guess I do have some concerns about the lesser included 
instruction" (R. 249:91). The trial court agreed: 
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Why did I just get this instruction at the end of the noon hour? 
My order was that any proposed jury instructions were to be in at the 
time of the pre-trial conference and even at the beginning of the noon 
hour I could have accommodated, I could have changed the charge to 
include a lesser included offense. It affects more than — I mean, it's 
not just a matter of sticking it in. You also have to change other 
instructions to accommodate it and why it's submitted this late, I 
can't understand. I mean it's just plain late. 
(R. 249:92). 
Defense counsel agreed that he "should have given it to you before the noon hour" 
(R. 249:93). Counsel admitted, "I simply left without giving it to you" (R. 249:93). 
The court then ruled: 
I'm rejecting the instruction first of all because it's late but 
second of all I'm rejecting it because I don't think that a jury could 
rationally find, well, in the second instance, it's not a lesser included 
offense.... It is not an offense that consists of less than all of the 
elements of the crime of [burglary]. It's a very much separate 
offense and in fact, he could be charged and convicted of both 
offenses in this case. Maybe that's not the case but anyway—and 
thirdly, there is no evidence in this case from which a jury could 
rationally find that he knew that it had been stolen or believed that it 
had been stolen. There was no testimony from him that he believed 
it to be stolen or that he knew that it had been stolen. That's the 
instruction that you requested. He was never asked whether he 
believed it had been stolen. He was never asked whether he knew it 
had been stolen and the instruction that you presented doesn't allow 
for conviction if he simply had reason to know. 
(R. 249:93-94). 
Defense counsel objected, arguing first, that "I simply put the language of the 
statute in, Your Honor," and second: 
Let me say this, Your Honor, I understand that I should have 
given it to you before lunch but we thought this was going to go until 
tomorrow. We never know if we're going to put lesser included 
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instructions in, first of all until I know whether my client is going to 
testify, whether or not the evidence comes in that way. I mean, I 
write one up so that we could do that but I don't know even until I 
talk to my client or all the evidence is presented whether we're going 
to ask for it and many times we don't ask for it on these occasions. 
(R. 249:94-95). The court responded: 
Well, you can always submit it in advance and withdraw it but 
if I'm not even alerted to the possibility that there's a lesser included 
theory, I mean that is some of the most difficult decisions judges 
make in these cases, whether to instruct on the lesser included 
offense and the reason why I ask for instructions to be submitted in 
advance of trial is so that I can do that research and do that thinking 
deliberately and not on the spur of the moment. 
(R. 249:95). The court further explained, "[a]ttempted theft could be a lesser included 
offense of burglary but theft by receiving, I don't see any stretch by which that can be a 
lesser included offense in burglary. But if there is a rational basis for doing that, that's 
the reason we need to have a heads up on this other than at the last minute" (R. 249:96). 
"And frankly, if this case were simply a case of theft of receiving stolen property and 
these are the elements of that, I'd grant a directed verdict. The case hasn't been made out. 
The jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt these elements" (R. 249:97). 
Defense counsel again objected, arguing: 
I don't have to present all the possible lesser included offenses that I 
might put in until—strategically I don't have to [do] that until the 
evidence is in. I don't know that there's anything that requires me to 
do that. 




The court responded: "When I as a Judge order the jury instructions be in as of a 
certain day, I don't know that you [cjan disregard that without peril, without risk, okay?" 
(R. 249:98). The court concluded: 
You know it would be different if you were surprised. I disagree. I 
strongly disagree that it's your strategic option to disregard my order 
to have your jury instructions in by a certain time. On the other hand 
if you were surprised by evidence, that would be one thing. But if 
this is your theory from day one, which it sounds like it was, then I 
think you need to have them in when I order them in. We'll be in 
recess. 
(R. 249:98-99). 
Defendant renewed his objection to the court's ruling in his motion for new trial 
(R. 189-90, 196-99; R. 250:Tab 1). After argument, the court denied defendant's motion: 
[P]art of the basis for my decision is the belie[f] is that the 
instruction was submitted late I always make it an order in the 
case that instructions are to be in at the time of the final pretrial 
conference but, you know, I recognize that things can come up 
during the trial and I don't hold people religiously to that. But after 
we've got to the point where the final jury instructions are prepared, 
absent surprise by something that happens during the trial, I'm not 
prepared, typically, at that time to entertain new jury instructions. 
Only in the event of a surprise would I be willing to do that and it's 
my firm recollection in this case that we had put the jury, I had put 
the jury instructions in final form. 
Secondly, it's my view that even that aside, I would not have 
given the lesser included offense instruction in this case. I think that 
the relationship between the charge of receiving stolen property is 
insufficiently related to the charge of burglary to justify the evidence 
in this case, a lesser included offense. 
And, thirdly, I don't think the jury could have rationally 
convicted the defendant of theft by receiving stolen property on the 
evidence that was presented in this case. The only evidence was the 
defendant's own testimony. The only alternate theory of how he 
received this equipment, this stereo equipment was his own 
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testimony and if the jury believed his testimony, there was nothing in 
his testimony that suggested that he knew or had reason to know that 
his property was stolen. 
(R. 250:Tab 1:16-17). 
Defendant's proposed jury instruction contains no date indicating when it was filed 
(R. 116). The instruction appears in the record immediately after the State's proposed 
instructions dated July 9, 2001 (R. 111-16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his proposed lesser-
included offense instruction because the instruction was timely presented and because he 
was entitled to the instruction under the general rule governing defense requested lesser 
included offense instructions. Neither of defendant's claims have merit. Moreover, 
defendant was not entitled to his proposed instruction bcause it did not accurately state 
the applicable law. 
Point I. The trial court properly rejected defendant's proposed instruction as 
untimely. As allowed under the rules of criminal procedure, the trial court twice ordered 
that all proposed jury instructions be submitted at the final pre-trial conference. 
Defendant did not object to the court's orders or request an exception to those orders for 
lesser-included offense instructions. Then, during the one-day trial, the court informed 
the parties that it would be compiling the jury instructions over the lunch break. 
Defendant did not file his proposed jury instruction until he returned from lunch. 
Moreover, defendant did not ask to discuss the instruction at that time but, rather 
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immediately began cross-examining the State's witness who was then on the stand. 
Under such circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting 
defendant's instruction as untimely. 
Point II. The trial court properly rejected defendant's proposed lesser-included 
offense instruction because defendant's own testimony did not allow the jury to both 
acquit defendant of the greater crime and convict him of the lesser. Conviction for 
receiving stolen property requires evidence that defendant knew or had reason to know 
the property was stolen at the time he received it. Defendant's testimony at trial was that 
he only learned the property was stolen after the police had already confiscated it. 
Because defendant's testimony supported a complete innocence defense and controverted 
a key element of the crime of possession of stolen property, defendant was not entitled to 
his lesser-included offense instruction. 
Point III. Even assuming defendant's first two claims have merit, defendant was 
not entitled to his proposed instruction because it did not accurately state the applicable 
law. Defendant's instruction requires that defendant unlawfully and intentionally receive, 
retain, or dispose of property knowing it has been stolen or believing that it has probably 
been stolen. The statute defining the crime of receiving stolen property does not contain 
the emphasized language. Because defendant's proposed instruction contains two 
elements not contained in the statutory definition, the instruction misstates the law, and 
thus, defendant had no right to it. Although the trial court did not reject defendant's 
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instruction on this basis, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any basis 
apparent in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROPOSE HIS LESSER-
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION UNTIL TWO COURT-
IMPOSED DEADLINES HAD PASSED AND THE TRIAL COURT 
HAD ALREADY COMPILED ITS INSTRUCTIONS, THE COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING THE 
INSTRUCTION AS UNTIMELY 
Defendant challenges on numerous grounds the trial court's ruling that his 
proposed jury instruction was untimely. Aplt. Br. at 30-32, 34-35, 37, 39. None of 
defendant's claims have merit. 
'Trial courts must be accorded reasonable latitude to move trials along." State v. 
Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). Thus, a trial court's ruling that a proposed jury 
instruction is untimely is reviewed for "abuse of discretion." Id.\ but see Schwartz v. 
Benzow, 2000 UT App 203, 2000 WL 33250573, at *1 (memorandum decision) 
(reviewing rejection of instruction as untimely "for correctness") (Addendum C). 
A. Defendant's appellate claim that he submitted his instruction 
prior to trial contradicts his own counsel's statements below. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his proposed instruction 
as untimely because "the record indicates that defense counsel submitted the proposed 
instruction at the first pretrial conference in July 2001, three months before . . . trial." 
Aplt. Br. at 30-32. Defendant relies on two parts of the record to support his claim. 
Defendant notes first that a court clerk, who is required to place documents in 
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chronological order in preparing the record on appeal, "placed the proposed instruction 
between the State's proposed instructions . . . which were filed on July 9, 2001, and the 
minute entry noting the postponement of the original trial date on July 10, 2001." Aplt. 
Br. at 32. He notes second that the trial court, at the August 2001 pre-trail conference, 
told the parties it '"already [had] your jury instructions and requested voir dire.'" Aplt. 
Br. at 32 (citing R. 252B:2). Defense counsel's own admissions below defeat his claim. 
At trial, the court announced it would be compiling jury instructions over the lunch 
break (R. 249:42-43). During a conference on instructions a short while later, the court 
asked defense counsel why he had not filed his instruction before lunch (R. 249:92). 
Counsel never argued that he had in fact submitted his instruction before trial (R. 249:92-
99). To the contrary, counsel admitted that he had only submitted his instruction after 
lunch when he acknowledged that he "should have given it to [the court] before the noon 
hour" and "apologize[d] for not making that known sooner" (R. 249:93). Similarly, when 
the issue was revisited in defendant's motion for new trial, counsel did not argue that he 
had submitted his instruction before trial (R. 250:Tab 1). Rather, he again admitted, "I 
simply brought the lesser included back from lunch" (R. 250:Tab 1:13, 14). 
The record upon which defendant now relies to contradict those admissions is 
insufficient. First, defendant's proposed instruction contains no date and thus no 
indication of where it should be placed chronologically in the file. Absent such 
indication, the court clerk's after-the-fact logical placement of the instruction with the 
State's instructions offers little insight as to when the instruction was actually proposed. 
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Second, when the trial court made its general statement that it had received the 
parties' proposed instructions, the court had already twice ordered the parties to submit 
their instructions, and the court had already received the State's proposed instructions (R. 
248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2; R. 111-15). The court's statement, then, could easily reflect its 
reasonable conclusion that, having received no instructions from defendant, the State's 
instructions were the only instructions the parties intended to propose. 
Given defense counsel's repeated admissions below that he did not file his 
instruction until after lunch on the day of trial, defendant's claim that the trial court erred 
in rejecting his instruction as untimely because he submitted it before trial fails. 
B. Defendant's claim that rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, allowed him to ignore the trial court's pre-trial 
orders requiring submission of proposed jury instructions by the 
final pre-trial conference fails under the rule's plain language. 
Twice prior to trial, the trial court ordered that proposed jury instructions be 
submitted by the final pre-trial conference (R. 248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2). On appeal, 
defendant claims that rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, gave him leave to 
ignore the court's orders. Aplt. Br. at 31-37. Rule 19 does not support defendant's claim. 
In making his argument, defendant relies on rule 19 as it was amended effective 
November 1, 2001. Aplt. Br. at 31-33 (citing language in subsections (a) and (b) that 
appears in amended rule but not the previous version); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 19 
(2002) (Addendum A). However, defendant's trial was held on October 4, 2001 (R. 249). 
Because defendant's trial occurred prior to the November amendment of the rule, the 
preceding version applies in considering defendant's claim. See State v. Nelson-
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Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, fflj 4-5, 17 n.6, 6 P.3d 1120 (applying rule of evidence as it 
existed at time of trial), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 
57, f 26,993P.2d837.1 
When interpreting a court rule, this Court applies the same rules of construction 
applicable to statutes. State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, \ 31, 20 P.3d 271. "When faced with 
a question of statutory construction, [this Court] look[s] first to the plain language of the 
statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation 
omitted). Terms are interpreted "'according to their commonly accepted meaning unless 
the ordinary meaning . . . results in an application that is either unreasonably confused, 
inoperable,... or in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" State ex 
rel L.P., 981 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah App. 1999) (citations omitted)). 
On October 4, 2001, rule 19(a) provided: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file [a] written request that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the 
same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other 
parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon 
the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be 
given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
Utah R.Crim. P. 19(a) (2001). 
'In relying on the version of the rule in effect at the time of defendant's trial, the 
State does not concede that a different result would occur under the amended rule. 
Because the amended rule was not in effect at the time of defendant's trial, this Court 
need not decide that issue. 
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This provision clearly states that parties may submit proposed jury instructions 
"[a]t the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs" 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of subsection (a), 
a trial court may order parties to submit their proposed jury instructions prior to the close 
of evidence. 
Nothing in the remaining subsections of the rule limits the trial court's authority 
under subsection (a) to order that instructions be submitted prior to the close of evidence. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(b)-(d). Moreover, nothing in the remaining subsections allows a 
criminal defendant to ignore the trial court if it enters such an order. Id. 
Consequently, defendant's claim that rule 19 authorized him to submit his 
proposed instruction after the court's pre-trial deadlines fails. 
C. Where defendant never objected to the trial court's pre-trial 
orders or its mid-trial compilation of jury instructions, the 
court's rejection of defendant's instruction as untimely was not 
an abuse of discretion. 
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his proposed 
instruction as untimely because (1) before lunch, the court "affirmatively represented that 
the parties could submit additional instructions following the lunch break," Aplt. Br. at 
34; and (2) "[bjasic fairness supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of 
the evidence," "strategic reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in 
advance," and the evidence supports his instruction, Aplt. Br. at 34, 35. Neither of 
defendant's claims have merit. 
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1. Defendant's claim that the court affirmatively indicated it 
would accept instructions after the lunch break is not 
supported by the record; moreover, given the trial court's 
pre-trial orders, defendant had no reasonable basis upon 
which to believe instructions would be accepted at trial. 
Defendant claims that, even if his proposed instruction was not submitted until 
trial, the trial court improperly rejected it because the court "affirmatively represented 
that the parties could submit additional instructions following the lunch break" and 
"defense counsel reasonably relied on the trial judge's representations based on his past 
practice with other judges." Aplt. Br. at 31, 34, 37. Defendant's claim is not supported 
by the record. 
Prior to lunch on the day of trial, the prosecutor stated that he believed all the 
evidence in the case would be presented by 3:30 p.m., and thus that the case could go to 
the jury later that afternoon (R. 249:42). The following then occurred: 
Court: In order to do that, we'd have to spend some time on 
jury instructions at some point and since you're 
apparently not available over the noon hour today, is 
that correct, [defense counsel]? 
Defense counsel: Right, Your Honor. I have to teach a class. I 
could take a look at the jury instructions. It's a simple 
case so I don't imagine I have — 
Court: I don't think we should need a lot of discussion. What 
I'll do is go ahead and put them together the way I 
propose to give them over the noon hour and those will 
be sitting on your desk when you get back and if you 
could find a moment to take a quick look at them and 
maybe just on the break we could have a discussion 
about that. 
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(R. 249:42-43). Nothing in the court's language even hints that the court would entertain 
new instructions after the lunch period. 
Moreover, prior to trial, the trial court twice ordered that proposed jury instructions 
be submitted by the final pre-trial conference (R. 248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2). Defendant 
neither objected to the court's orders nor requested an exception for lesser-included 
offense instructions. Under such circumstances, defendant had no reasonable basis upon 
which to rely on other courts' practices in assuming the court would accept additional 
jury instructions during trial. 
Consequently, defendant's claim that he reasonably relied on the trial court's 
representations at trial in offering his instruction after lunch fails. 
2. State v. Evans defeats defendant's claim that "basic fairness/9 
"strategic reasons," and the evidence at trial render the trial 
court's ruling an abuse of discretion. 
Defendant claims that, even if he submitted his instruction late, the trial court 
abused its discretion in rejecting the instruction as untimely because "[bjasic fairness 
supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of the evidence," because 
"strategic reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in advance," and 
because the evidence supports his instruction, Aplt. Br. at 34, 35. State v. Evans, 668 
P.2d 566 (Utah 1983), and sound policy considerations defeat his claim. 
In State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 567 (Utah 1983), the trial court announced at the 
close of evidence that it would recess for a period during which it would compile its jury 
instructions. When the court reconvened, Evans proffered lesser-included offense 
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instructions, which the trial court rejected. Id. On appeal, Evans challenged the trial 
court's ruling, arguing that the evidence "was sufficient to support a jury instruction on 
[a] lesser included offense." Id. In rejected Evan's claim, the supreme court noted that 
"[cjounsel had not advised the court of the necessity for an extension of time to prepare 
[his instructions]; nor . . . had he earlier notified the court that he even intended to submit 
them." Id. "[H]aving failed to timely request an instruction . . . , the defendant is not 
now in any position to complain of the court's failure to give it." Evans, 668 P.2d at 567; 
see also Schwartz v. Benzow, 2000 UT App 203, 2000 WL 33250573, at *1 
(memorandum decision) (affirming trial court's denial of proposed instruction filed after 
court-ordered deadline where party had "fail[ed] to notify the court that she wished to 
submit jury instructions by the court's specified deadline") (Addendum C). Rather, 
"counsel's failure to notify the court that he wished to submit requested instructions 
knowing that the court would be preparing them during the recess, carries with it the same 
consequence of failing to submit them at all." Evans, 668 P.2d at 568. 
Evans disposes of defendant's claim here. Twice prior to trial, the trial court 
ordered that all proposed jury instructions be filed by the final pre-trial conference (R. 
248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2). Defendant neither objected to the court's orders nor requested 
an exception for lesser included offense instructions. Then, at trial, the court indicated 
before lunch that it would be compiling its proposed jury instructions over the lunch 
break (R. 249:42). Defendant again did nothing to alert the court that he intended to 
submit additional instructions (R. 249:42-43). Thus, despite numerous opportunities 
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either to present his instruction to the court in a timely manner or to inform the court that 
such an instruction may be forthcoming, defendant did nothing until after the court had 
compiled its instructions. Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to accept defendant's belated request. Evans, 668 P.2d at 567-68. 
Defendant's attempts to distinguish Evans are unavailing. First, defendant claims 
that Evans does not apply because "defense counsel below specifically preserved the 
denial of the lesser offense instruction for appeal by following the procedures set forth in 
Rule 19." Aplt. Br. at 40. However, when Evans was decided, the rule governing jury 
instructions was identical to rule 19 at the time of defendant's trial. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-19 (1982) (Addendum A); see also Point LB. supra. Thus, defendant's reliance 
on rule 19 to distinguish Evans is unfounded. 
Second, defendant claims that Evans does not apply because "defense counsel. . . 
follow[ed] up [his] request [at trial] with a motion for new trial." Aplt. Br. at 40. 
However, "[r]aising an issue in a post-trial motion . . . does not [automatically] preserve 
that issue for appeal." Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 & n.6 (Utah 
App. 1994); see also State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
Rather, before this Court will find the matter preserved, the trial court, in ruling on the 
motion, must either expressly or implicitly waive defendant's prior waiver. See, e.g., 
State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) (holding "trial court in 
effect reopened the trial when it held an evidentiary hearing to address defendant's claim" 
after trial); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991); State v. Johnson, 821 
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P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). Here, in denying defendant's motion for new trial, the trial 
court specifically re-iterated its untimeliness ruling (R. 250:Tab 1:16-17). Thus, 
defendant's reassertion of his claim in his motion for new trial did nothing to cure his 
waiver under Evans. 
Third, defendant claims that Evans does not apply because "the trial judge in this 
case never indicated that he planned to instruct the jury immediately after the lunch recess 
or that the time for requesting additional instructions had passed." Aplt. Br. at 40. 
However, Evans nowhere suggests that the trial court's intention to immediately instruct 
the jury after compiling its instructions was the determinative issue in affirming the trial 
court's untimeliness ruling; rather, the determinative issue was that defendant had neither 
proffered his proposed instructions nor intimated that they might be forthcoming until 
after the trial court, with notice to the parties, had compiled its instructions. Evans, 668 
P.2d at 567. And, as previously discussed, where the court issued two pre-trial orders 
requiring that instructions be submitted before trial, and then expressly stated its intention 
to compile jury instructions over the lunch hour, defendant should have clearly known 
that "the time for requesting additional had passed." Aplt. Br. at 40. 
Fourth, defendant claims that Evans does not apply here because the evidence 
supports his lesser-included offense instruction. Aplt. Br. at 31. However, the defendant 
raised the same claim on appeal in challenging that trial court's ruling in Evans. Evans, 
668 P.2d at 567. The supreme court rejected it. Id. at 567-68. 
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Finally, defendant claims that Evans does not apply because "basic fairness 
supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of the evidence" and "strategic 
reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in advance." Aplt. Br. at 34-35. 
Both of these challenges, however, could and should have been raised when the trial court 
first entered its pre-trial orders or, at the latest, when the court indicated it would be 
compiling its instructions over the lunch break. Cf State v. Johnson, 11r4 P.2d 1141, 
1144 (Utah 1989) (holding "'a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claims on appeal'") (citation omitted). Neither serves as 
an after-the-fact justification for remaining silent. 
Moreover, defendant's "basic fairness" and "strategic reasons" claims raise serious 
equity issues for both the trial court and the State when, as here, defendant's request for a 
lesser offense instruction involves an offense that is not "necessarily included" in the 
offense charged.2 
As the trial court noted, and indeed as this case highlights, see Points II and HI 
infra, whether to instruct the jury on such lesser-included offenses "[are] some of the 
most difficult decisions judges make in these cases" (R. 249:95). A responsible court, 
2A lesser offense is "necessarily included" in the greater when "the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 155-56 (Utah 1983). Under Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), a defendant is, upon 
proper request, entitled not only to a lesser included offense instruction on necessarily 
included offenses but on any lesser offenses that are "related" to the charged offense 
"because some of their statutory elements overlap, and . . . the evidence at the trial of the 
greater offense includes proof of some or all of those overlapping elements." Id. at 159. 
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therefore, may understandably want "a heads up" that an instruction may be forthcoming 
so that the court may "do . . . research and . . . think[] deliberately" in deciding its 
appropriateness (R. 249:95-96). Yet, if "basic fairness" and "strategic reasons" require 
courts to accept surprise instructions at the close of evidence despite prior orders to 
propose them earlier, the responsible court may very well feel compelled to make its 
decision "on the spur of the moment," thereby increasing the possibility of error, since the 
only other option would be to impose a potentially lengthy delay on the proceedings in 
order to given the instructions their due consideration (R. 249:95). Certainly, neither 
"basic fairness" nor "strategic reasons" justify this result. 
Moreover, as defendant correctly notes, the State "bear[s] the burden of proving 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even on lesser offenses." Aplt. Br. at 35. Yet, if a 
defendant can ignore a court order that instructions be submitted prior to trial and wait to 
request a lesser included offense instruction until the close of evidence, the State will 
have been placed in the untenable position of not knowing what it has to prove until it is 
too late to prove it. In addition, the State, like the court, is forced to address the 
appropriateness of the proposed instruction, see Point II infra, and the correctness of the 
proposed instruction, see Point III infra, "on the spur of the moment," without adequate 
time to research either issue. 
As the supreme court held in State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 506-07 (Utah 1997), 
"[b]oth parties"—not just the State—"share a duty to help ensure a fair trial" Thus, 
defendant has no more right to an "acquittal by ambush" than does the State to a "trial by 
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ambush." Jones v. State, 575 S.E.2d 456, 459 (Ga. 2003). Yet, this is exactly what a 
defendant is encouraged to do if "basic fairness" and "strategic reasons" allow him, 
contrary to court orders otherwise, to withhold such lesser-included offense instructions 
until the close of evidence. 
Surprises at trial, of course, may necessitate consideration of instructions offered 
outside a trial court's orders. However, where, as the court noted here, defendant planned 
to submit his instruction "from day one" (R. 249:98-99), this was not such a case. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, then, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting defendant's lesser-included offense instruction as untimely. 
D. Defendant cannot establish that the trial court's rejection of his 
instruction constituted manifest injustice where case law 
supports the trial court's ruling. 
Finally, defendant argues that, "[e]ven if defense counsel had delayed in 
requesting the instruction, the trial judge . . . committed a manifest injustice in refusing to 
instruct the jury on [his] theory of the case." Aplt. Br. at 31. 
"When reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, [this Court] generally use[s] the 
same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists." State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). Under that standard, defendant must show that the 
trial court committed error, that the error should have been obvious, and that the error was 
"of sufficient magnitude that it affect[ed] the substantial rights of the party." Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Here, defendant's complete argument in support of his manifest injustice claim is 
that, "[a]s demonstrated previously, the trial court plainly erred in refusing to give the 
jury the option of convicting [him] based on the facts rather than what the prosecutor 
opted to charge." Aplt. Br. at 42-43. However, as discussed above, none of defendant's 
prior claims establish that the trial court erred, let alone obviously erred, in rejecting 
defendant's instruction as untimely. See pp. 13-25 infra. 
Consequently, defendant's challenge to the trial court's rejection of his instruction 
as untimely fails. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION WHERE 
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY, IF BELIEVED, WOULD 
ACQUIT HIM ON POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY 
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred in refusing to give the lesser offense 
instruction" because "the crimes of burglary and receiving stolen property overlapped'' 
and the evidence at trial "supported acquitting [him] of burglary and convicting him of 
receiving stolen property." Aplt Br. at 22, 23. However, because defendant's own 
testimony at trial was inconsistent with a finding of guilt for possession of stolen 
property, the trial court properly rejected defendant's instruction. 
A defendant generally has the right to a lesser-included offense instruction if 
"(1) the two offenses are related because some of their statutory 
elements overlap, and the evidence at trial of the greater offense 
involves proof of some or all of those overlapping elements; and 
(2) the evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the 
lesser-included offense." 
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State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, \ 23, 61 P.3d 1019 (quoting State v. Evans, 2002 UT 22,1J 18, 
20P.3d888). 
However, a defendant has no right to a lesser-included offense instruction where 
he denies any complicity at all "and thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict." 
State v. Doughery, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1976), disapproved of on other grounds by 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983); see also State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 
790 (Utah 1984) (holding that where "[a]ll the evidence defendant presented at trial was 
to the effect that he had not caused [the victim's] death,.. . [defendant's own theory of 
defense precluded the requested [lesser-included offense] instruction on manslaughter"); 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 533-534 (Utah 1983) (holding manslaughter instruction 
properly refused in murder conviction where defendants attempted to show they had not 
caused victim's death); State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159-60 (Utah 1983) (holding 
defendant was not entitled to lesser-included offense instruction against burglary charge 
where u[t]he thrust of the defendant's evidence . . . was to negate any specific intent at all, 
not to prove the existence of one of the intents necessary for criminal trespass"); State v. 
Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Utah App. 1992) (holding instruction on criminal trespass 
properly denied in burglary conviction where defendant testified he never entered the 
premises); see also United States v. Brown, 26 F.3d 119, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) ("When a 
defendant relies on an exculpatory defense that, if believed, would lead to acquittals on 
both the greater and lesser charges, it is no abuse of discretion to refuse to instruct the 
jury on a lesser included offense."); State v. German, 30 P.3d 360, 362 f 11 (Mont. 2001) 
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("A lesser-included offense instruction is not supported by the evidence when the 
defendant's evidence or theory, if believed, would require an acquittal."); Walker v. 
State, 876 P.2d 646, 649 (Nev. 1*994) ('To be entitled to an instruction as to a lesser 
included offense, the defendant's theory of defense must be consistent with a conviction 
for the lesser offense."). 
In this case, defendant requested a lesser-included jury instruction on possession of 
stolen property (R. 116). Defendant's request was based on his own testimony that he did 
not participate in the burglary but rather received the property later that day at his home 
from three friends who wanted him to fix the VCR (R. 249:92; R. 250:Tab 1:3-4). 
Defendant argued that this testimony, combined with his father's somewhat corroborating 
testimony, the location of the equipment under a blanket in his room, and his own 
testimony on cross-examination suggesting he didn't know much about electrical 
components, supported his instruction (R. 249:92; R. 250:Tab 1:3-4). The trial court 
rejected defendant's argument, ruling that where "[t]here was no testimony from 
[defendant] that he believed [the property] to be stolen or that he knew that it was stolen," 
the evidence did not support defendant's instruction (R. 249:93-94). 
Even assuming arguendo that possession of stolen property is sufficiently related 
to burglary to support a lesser-included offense instruction, defendant's own testimony, in 
which he denied complicity in either the charged crime or the lesser included, rendered 
the evidence insufficient to support the instruction in this case. See Shabata, 678 P.2d at 
790; Crick, 675 P.2d at 533-34; Baker, 671 P.2d at 159-60; Doughery, 550 P.2d at 176; 
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Cox, 826 P.2d at 662-63; Brown, 26 F.3d at 120; German, 30 P.3d at 362; Walker, 876 
P.2dat575. 
A person is guilty of receiving stolen property if: 
[ 1 ] he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
[2] knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably 
has been stolen, OR 
[la] [he] conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling or 
withholding the property from the owner 
[2a] knowing the property to be stolen 
[3] intending to deprive the owner of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). 
Here, defendant testified that he did not learn that the property was stolen until 
after he had heard that the police had confiscated it (R. 249:79, 81-82). This testimony, if 
believed, would acquit him of possession of stolen property. Thus, "[t]he thrust of the 
defendant's evidence . . . was to negate any specific intent at all, not to prove the 
existence of. . . the intent[] necessary for [the lesser-included offense]." Baker, 671 P.2d 
at 159-60. 
Because defendant's testimony "la[id] no foundation for any intermediate verdict," 
Doughery, 550 P.2d at 176, the trial court properly rejected his lesser-included offense 
instruction as unsupported by the evidence. 
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HI. DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON POSSESSION OF STOLEN 
PROPERTY WHERE THE INSTRUCTION CONTAINED TWO 
ELEMENTS NOT REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND THUS DID NOT 
ACCURATELY STATE THE APPLICABLE LAW 
Both during trial and in response to defendant's motion for new trial, the State 
argued that, in addition to rejecting defendant's instruction because it was untimely and 
unsupported by the evidence, the trial court should reject it because it did not accurately 
define the applicable law (R. 222; R. 249:96-97; R. 250:Tab 1:12). Although the trial 
court did not rule on this part of the State's argument, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's ruling on this ground because it is apparent in the record. See State v. Allred, 
2002 UT App 291,111, 55 P.2d 1158 ("[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may 
affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
trial court.") (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). 
"Generally, a defendant is entitled to instruction on his theory of the case if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify giving the requested instruction." State v. 
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Utah 1989). However, "[t]he trial court may reject the 
defendant's instruction where the instruction incorrectly states the law." State v. Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, 1 21, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Dumas, 111 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986). An instruction that adds elements to a 
crime beyond that required by statute incorrectly states the law. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at 
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f 23 (affirming trial court's rejection of proposed instruction that added elements to 
felony murder beyond those required by statute). 
In this case, defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on possession of 
stolen property as a lesser-included offense of burglary (R. 116). As stated previously, 
under section 76-6-408, a person is guilty of receiving stolen property if: 
[1] he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
[2] knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably 
has been stolen, OR 
[la] [he] conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling or 
withholding the property from the owner 
[2a] knowing the property to be stolen 
[3] intending to deprive the owner of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). 
Defendant's proposed instruction, in contrast, provided: 
Before you can convict the defendant of the 
crime of Receiving Stolen Property, Theft, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
of the following elements of that crime: 
1. In Salt lake County, on or about August 14, 2000, the 
defendant; 
2. Unlawfully9, and 
3- Intentionally, 
4. Received, retained or disposed of property of another; 
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5. Knowing that it had been stolen, or believing that it probably 
had been stolen, or concealed or withheld or aided in 
concealing or withholding property of another knowing it to 
be stolen; and 
6. Intended to deprive the owner of the property. 
(R. 116) (emphasis added). 
A simple comparison of the statutory elements and the elements set forth in 
defendant's instruction reveals that defendant's instruction includes two elements—that 
he received the property unlawfully and that he received it intentionally—not required 
under the statute. 
Thus, under defendant's instruction, the State had to prove not only that defendant 
received property knowing it had been stolen or had probably been stolen—as required 
under the statute—but also that he did so "'other than accidentally] or careless[ly]'" and 
"'without justification.'" State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, f 18, 64 PJd 1218 (explaining 
impact of inserting "intentionally" and "unlawfully" into criminal statute) (quoting State 
v. Durant, 61A P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1983)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999) 
(providing that person acts "[ijntentionally . . .with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result"). 
Because defendant's instruction increased the burden of the State beyond that 
required under the statute, it was clearly an incorrect statement of the law. See Bluff, 
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2002 UT 66 at J 23. Consequently, defendant was not entitled to it. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 
at 1 21; James, 819 P.2d at 798-99; Dumas, 721 P.2d at 506.3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED _/_7_ April 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
3
 Although defendant claims that, instead of rejecting his instruction, the trial court 
should have taken steps to correct it, defendant cites no legal authority in Utah, nor has 
the State found any, for that proposition. Rather, our courts have simply held that "[t]he 
trial court may reject the defendant's instruction where the instruction incorrectly states 
the law." Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at 121; see also James, 819 P.2d at 798-99; Dumas, 111 
P.2d at 506. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 19(2001) 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instruc-
tions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(2002) 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may 
instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of 
proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the 
definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter 
stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the court 
in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. 
Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to each juror. 
At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a 
party may file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as 
set forth in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a 
requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the 
parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this 
requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law 
if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to 
giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to 
do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an interim 
written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. Final 
instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The 
court shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its 
discretion, provide a copy to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions 
are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court 
shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. 
Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. 
In statig the objection the party shall identify the matter to whcih the objection 
is made and the ground of the objection.matter to which he objects and the 
ground of his objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
given the jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any 
limitation upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-19 (1982) 
77-35-19. Rule 19 — Instructions, (a) At the close of the evidence or 
at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth 
in the request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished 
to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be 
given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the 
court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given 
and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement 
what part of the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the 
court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are 
the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court 
has instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation 
upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999) 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
ase of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
r j ^ e i 
Not Reported in P.2d 
2000 IT App 203 
(Cite as: 2000 VVL 33250573 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Rae Lyn SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
David BENZOW, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 990328-CA. 
June 29, 2000. 
James W. Jensen, Cedar City, and Bruce H. Nauel and 
Andrew R. Bronsnick, Livingston, NJ, for appellant. 
Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME. JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
GREENWrOOD. 
*1 Rae Lyn Schwartz appeals from a jury verdict 
finding both parties fifty percent at fault, resulting in a 
judgment for defendant, David Benzow. Specifically, 
Schwartz appeals three rulings by the trial court: (1) 
failure to grant a new trial because of an inconsistent 
jury verdict, (2) admission of hearsay evidence at trial, 
and (3) refusal to give a requested jury instruction. We 
affirm. 
Schwartz argues that she is entitled to a new trial 
because the jury verdict was inconsistent. Schwartz first 
objected to the inconsistent verdict approximately two 
months after the jury rendered its verdict, in a motion 
for a new trial, which the trial court subsequently 
denied. The "failure to object to a verdict, informal or 
insufficient on its face, before the jury is discharged, 
constitutes a waiver of that objection." Ute~Cal Land 
Dev. Corp. v. Sather. 605 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Utah 1980) 
(citation omitted). "[C]ounsel has the obligation not 
only to object to the form of the verdict, but to 
affirmatively seek to examine it." Martmeau v. 
Anderson. 636 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Utah 1981). Because 
Schwartz failed to raise concerns about the 
inconsistency of the jury verdict until more than two 
Copr. © West 2003 No ( 
months after the jury was discharged, Schwartz wai\ ed 
any challenge to the jury verdict. 
Next, Schwartz argues that admission of hearsay 
testimony at trial was prejudicial error. We review 
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion; however, 
" ' "[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the 
error is harmful." *" Suite v Jaeser. 1999 UT 1, c 30. 
973 P.2d404 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
Schwartz objects to the police officer's testimony that 
one biker told him that she did not recall a jeep passing 
by at all and that a second biker told him that the jeep 
was fifteen feet past Schwartz when the crash occurred. 
However, a third biker, Jeffery Branigan, who was 
Schwartz's witness, directly testified that he saw the 
jeep crowd and honk at the bikers but did not see the 
jeep make contact with Schwartz's bike. Both hearsay 
statements, admitted through the police officer's 
testimony, are entirely consistent with the core of 
Branigan's testimony, namely that he did not see 
contact between the jeep and Schwartz's bike. 
Therefore, if the admission of the hearsay statements 
was error, the error was harmless and not reversible. 
Finally, Schwartz claims that it was prejudicial for the 
trial judge to deny her request for a jury instruction 
about the illegality of driving across a double yellow 
line. "We review a judge's refusal to give a jury 
instruction for correctness, as it is a question of law." 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery. Inc.. 1999 UT 109, «i 9, 
992P.2d969, Schwartz's failure to notify the court that 
she wished to submit jury instructions by the court's 
specified deadline "carries with it the same 
consequence of failing to submit them at all." State v 
Evans. 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). A pretrial order 
specified that the last day to submit jury instructions 
was October 20, 1998. The jury instruction under 
appeal was not filed until November 18, 1999. 
Therefore, by submitting the jury instruction to the 
court after the deadline, Schwartz waived any challenge 
to the trial judge's refusal to give the instruction. 
Furthermore, we fail to see how the instruction would 
have benefitted Schwartz, since under the 
circumstances of this case, breaking the law by crossing 
the double yellow line mitigates against Benzow's 
negligence in that if he did so, it would only have 
helped him to avoid the bikers. 
*2 Schwartz's objection to the inconsistent jury verdict, 
as well as her request for the jury instruction were not 
timely, and therefore, Schwartz waived these issues. 
Also, if the admission of the hearsay testimony at trial 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
was error, the error was harmless. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
BILLINGS and QRME. JJ., concur. 
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